Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History by Havenhill, Maria et al.
TRENDS IN HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT: FAILURE TOLERANCE, HIGH RELIABILITY 
AND CORRELATED FAILURE HISTORY 
Carrie Green(1), Maria Havenhill(2), Deboshri Sadhukhan(3), John Bobanga(4), 
Joyoshri Sadhukhan(5), Matthew Fiedler(6) 
(1)NASA, 21000 Brookpark Rd., Cleveland, OH 44135, USA, Email:Carrie.L.Green@nasa.gov
(2) NASA, 21000 Brookpark Rd., Cleveland, OH 44135, USA, Email:Maria.A.Havenhill@nasa.gov
(3) NASA, 21000 Brookpark Rd., Cleveland, OH 44135, USA, Email:Deboshri.Sadhukhan@nasa.gov
(4)NASA, 21000 Brookpark Rd., Cleveland, OH 44135, USA, Email: John.O.Bobanga@nasa.gov
(5) The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA, Email:Sadhukhan.2@buckeyemail.osu.edu
(6) The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA, Email:Fiedler.32@buckeyemail.osu.edu
ABSTRACT 
In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has 
continuously refined agency safety and reliability 
requirements in response to mission demands, critical 
failures, and technology development.  Early spacecraft, 
including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were 
highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and 
demonstrated test margins.  Later programs, such as the 
reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and 
International Space Station (ISS), introduced 
probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance 
to improve robustness at the expense of added 
complexity.  More recently, the Orion Multi-Program 
Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal 
single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; 
Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum 
Risk (DFMR) hardware.  Failure tolerance variances are 
defined and managed in accordance with agency 
human-rating requirements, and require concurrence 
from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the 
MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and 
Engineering Review Panel (MSERP).   
To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, 
Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep 
Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) 
representatives conducted accelerated research to 
compare unique safety and reliability criteria against 
ground and flight anomalies, based on information 
contained in post-mission reports and the Problem 
Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database.  In 
some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes 
have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety 
requirements.  In others, empirical trends have 
highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety 
guidelines.  Given the inability to achieve absolute 
compliance with evolving safety and reliability 
requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of 
DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the 
framework of changing system design, inspection, 
materials and process developments to formulate 
conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, 
and net changes in safety risk.  Based on the aggregate 
performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant 
systems, the authors have attempted to establish best 
practices and guidelines to inform future program 
decisions.     
On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not 
intended to direct a universal set of requirements for 
future missions based on prior lessons learned. 
Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and 
attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee 
future success.  However, this assessment offers a 
retrospective review of policy changes, implementation 
and effectiveness.  In the future, NASA, European 
Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit 
from a more robust correlation between requirements 
and performance, as space-faring nations work toward 
more challenging, complex and long-duration 
commercial and deep-space ventures. 
1. ARCHIVAL RECORDS
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned 
to repeat it.” – George Santayana 
In the fifty years that have elapsed since the Apollo 11 
moon landing, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) has dedicated resources to 
collect, archive and maintain our invaluable space-
faring records.  From the Apollo experience reports to 
the Space Shuttle Problem Reporting and Corrective 
Action (PRACA) database, an expansive reference 
library is available for those trained in the art of data 
collection and management.    
 Unfortunately, for the average practitioner, many of 
these program records are not yet available online.  
Instead, a large number of Gemini, Apollo and Space 
Shuttle Program documents are being stored at NASA 
facilities and National Archives locations across the 
United States.  While carefully maintained, these file 
sets contain hundreds of boxes without a corresponding 
index, and folders are often  empty aside from a few 
obsolete cross-references to microfiche copies of critical 
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 historic files, including the Apollo Failure Modes and 
Effects Analyses (FMEA) and Probabilistic Risk 
Analyses (PRA).  Failure reports are also largely 
scattered and illegible, making for long hours of 
research and unfulfilled leads.     
Compounding the difficulty of maintaining historic 
documents in hard copy, online records present a unique 
set of challenges.  Heritage Space Shuttle pre-flight 
reports from the 1980’s and 1990’s are currently stored 
in outdated and unsupported file formats, leaving the 
research team with partial records and large gaps in 
early and mid-program data. 
 
In spite of these obstacles, the local S&MA research 
team spent two weeks at various National Archives 
facilities, and collected a plethora of detailed design and 
production reports that offer a unique perspective on 
many of the the same issues facing human-spacefaring 
enterprises today.  Hundreds of Apollo, Shuttle and 
Orion records were pulled and digitized to assess single-
point failures, failure criticalities, corrective actions and 
general lessons learned.  This interim report offers 
preliminary insight into previously untapped cross-
program data analysis, and provides a framework for 
future research in this field. 
 
2. FMEA CRITICALITY COMPARISON 
2.1 Human-Rated Bipropellant Propulsion Systems 
 
Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion propulsion subsystems 
were generically designed with a similar set of 
guidelines to enable active pressurization, pressure 
relief, propellant distribution, and attitude and 
translation control [1][2][3].    However, as bipropellant 
system technology has remained fairly static since the 
1960’s, qualitative and quantitative failure tolerance 
requirements have changed much more frequently.  
Apollo initially mandated a probability of safe crew 
return design standard (0.999) and employed 
redundancy wherever practical, with specific exceptions 
for the structure, heat shield, and certain portions of the 
main propulsion systems.  The Space Shuttle directed a 
fail-safe design for all nominal and abort conditions, 
managing exceptions through Critical Items Lists (CIL) 
[4].  And early Orion requirements defaulted to two-
failure tolerance, but later evolved to specify no less 
than single-failure tolerance with provisions for zero-
failure tolerant exceptions pending MSERP and 
technical authority concurrence [5].   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Apollo Service Propulsion System (SPS) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Shuttle Orbital Manoeuvring System (OMS) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. MPCV Orion European Service Module 
(ESM) Propulsion Subsystem 
 
To compare unique propulsion design attributes across 
multiple systems, a diagnostic tool was developed to 
generically map component types, prevalent failure 
modes and criticality designations from vehicle to 
vehicle.  As noted previously, Apollo Crew and Service 
Module (CSM) and Space Shuttle Orbital Manoeuvring 
System/Reaction Control System (OMS/RCS) hardware 
FMEAs were not available within advertised folders at 
the National Archives.  In the absence of this data, 
S&MA representatives defined criticalities based on 
2
 design files, an Apollo Single Point Failure (SPF) 
analysis [6] and a comparative FMEA analysis on the 
Shuttle Knowledge Console [7].  Relative criticalities 
were then compared across programs as follows:  
• (+1) Additional redundant instrumentation, 
increased failure tolerance 
• (-1) Additional hardware or failure modes, 
decreased failure tolerance  
Aggregate results for each type of hardware are 
summarized in Table (1), and causal factors are 
addressed in Table (2).   
 
Component Orion vs. Apollo Shuttle vs. Apollo 
Burst Disc/Relief Valves -1 0 
Check Valves 0 -3 
Engines -2 6 
Fill/Drain Valves 0 0 
Filters -1 -1 
Lines 1 0 
Pressurization Valves -2 -4 
Propellant Valves 0 -3 
Pyro Valves -3 0 
Regulators 1 1 
Sensors 7 8 
Tanks 0 0 
 
Table 1. Multi-Vehicle Qualitative Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis Comparison 
 
 
Component FMEA Distinctions 
Burst Disc/Relief Valves Pressurization system architecture  
Check Valves Common feed system, internal and/or 
external check valves 
Engines Feed system complexity, pneumatic 
redundancy 
Fill/Drain Valves Pressurization and propellant fill/drain 
valve failure tolerance 
Filters Single-point blockage failures   
Lines Elimination of flexible line bellows 
Pressurization Valves Vapor migration protection, improved 
instrumentation, cross-feed complexity  
Propellant Valves Tank isolation complexity, non-isolatable 
bellows   
Pyro Valves Additional valves 
Regulators Improved instrumentation 
Sensors Improved instrumentation 
Tanks All propellant leakage assumed to be a 
worst-case Criticality 1 
 
Table 2. FMEA Criticality Differences 
For this particular study, crew survival methods, 
including cross-feed and lunar module recovery, were 
not considered in the raw criticality scores; however, 
these systems could influence the survivability of select 
failures including external leakage and blockage.   
 
3. FAILURE HISTORY CORRELATION 
3.1 Analysis Methodology 
 
As described above, the quantity and quality of readily 
available failure history data was somewhat limited.  A 
few additional, important caveats are highlighted below.   
 
Data acquisition for Apollo proved to be the most 
challenging piece of this investigation.  Flight data was 
generally available in post-mission reports; however, 
ground data was limited to sparse carbon copy 
Discrepancy Reports (DR) that were collected and 
scanned at various National Archives locations.  While 
the Apollo ground failure database may not have been 
complete, the raw number of retrieved DRs was within 
family with respect to recovered space shuttle and Orion 
files.   
 
Shuttle flight reports and pre-flight reports, while 
extensive, were also not converted to an appropriate 
Microsoft Office format within sufficient time to 
support this study.  Due to the large volume of Orbital 
Manoeuvring System (OMS) and Reaction Control 
System (RCS) data, this study has been constrained to 
OMS data for forty-five (45) missions between Space 
Transportation System STS-31 and STS-114.  All OMS 
and RCS flight failures have been captured in Mission 
Evaluation Reports (MER) and are included in this 
report.  
 
Finally, Orion propulsion anomalies were limited to 
data contained within the cross-program Problem 
Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. 
These reports were also somewhat incomplete 
considering open component and vehicle qualification 
testing, and unproven flight performance. 
 
For the purpose of this study, criticality assignments on 
all discrepancy reports were universally adapted to 
reflect Orion FMEA ground rules and assumptions, as 
defined in the Orion MPCV Program Hardware Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List 
(FMEA/CIL) Requirements Document [8].  Interfacing 
ground system, electrical system and thermal system 
failures were excluded from each data set, and are 
considered forward work. 
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3.2 Anomalies over Time 
 
The following trend charts reflect Apollo, Space Shuttle 
and Orion anomaly counts for a given failure criticality 
over time.   
 
3.2.1 Ground Anomalies over Time 
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Figure 4. Apollo Propulsion Number of Ground 
Anomalies by Year 
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Figure 5. Space Shuttle Propulsion Number of Ground 
Anomalies by Year 
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Figure 6. Orion Propulsion Number of Ground 
Anomalies by Year 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Flight Anomalies over Time 
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Figure 7. Apollo Propulsion Number of Flight 
Anomalies by Mission 
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Figure 8. Space Shuttle Propulsion Number of Flight 
Anomalies by Year 
 
 
3.2.3 Timeline Analysis Summary 
 
Plotting the severity and quantity of major anomalies for 
a given vehicle campaign highlighted several interesting 
trends.  First, as anticipated, failures occurred at a 
higher frequency earlier in each program, reinforcing 
program development risk and infant mortality.   
 
Criticality 1 failures were also somewhat prevalent, 
although most were attributable to propellant leakage 
from tanks, lines and engine valves.  The frequency of 
these events generally decreased over the time, but the 
high density of leakage failures highlighted the 
importance of adequate leak detection.   
 
Finally, a broader distribution of lower-criticality 
failures was observable in Apollo and space shuttle 
plots as a direct result of the expansive feed system 
redundancy present in these systems.  Regardless, all 
vehicles featured roughly the same magnitude of 
Criticality 1/1R2 failures (maximum: 6-15 occurrences 
per year on the ground, 2-5 occurrences per year in 
flight). 
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3.3 Anomalies by Component Type 
 
3.3.1 Ground Anomalies by Component Type 
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Figure 9. Apollo Propulsion Ground Anomalies by 
Component 
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Figure 10. Space Shuttle OMS Propulsion Ground 
Anomalies by Component 
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Figure 11. Orion Propulsion Ground Anomalies by 
Component 
 
 
3.3.2 Flight Anomalies by Component Type 
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Figure 12. Apollo Propulsion Flight Anomalies by 
Component 
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Figure 13. Space Shuttle Propulsion Flight Anomalies 
by Component 
 
3.3.4 Composition Analysis Summary 
 
Plotting failures by component type was also useful, and 
allowed the team to shed perspective on the prevalence 
of certain types of hardware failures.  One particularly 
interesting trend centred around the close relationship 
between ground and flight distributions on each vehicle.  
The propagation between ground and flight reinforced 
the importance of good component design principles, 
and the potential for recurring issues throughout the 
project life cycle for a given part. 
 
Taking the data as a whole, valve failures were very 
common, and sensor failures became more prominent 
on space shuttle and Orion spacecraft as designers 
incorporated additional instrumentation.  Engine failures 
were a fairly uniform contributor on the ground, 
although flight failure density was highly dependent on 
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 a predisposition toward leakage and failed-off 
conditions. 
 
3.4 Anomalies by Criticality 
 
3.4.1 Ground Anomalies by Criticality 
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Figure 14. Apollo Number of Ground Anomalies by 
Component based on Criticality 
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Figure 15. Shuttle OMS Number of Ground Anomalies 
by Component based on Criticality 
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Figure 16. Orion Propulsion Number of Ground 
Anomalies by Component based on Criticality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Flight Anomalies by Criticality 
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Figure 17. Apollo Number of Flight Anomalies by 
Component based on Criticality 
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Figure 18. Space Shuttle Number of Flight Anomalies 
by Component based on Criticality 
 
3.4.3 Criticality Analysis Summary 
 
Comparing flight and ground criticalities per vehicle 
yielded results that were very similar to the last data set; 
specifically, ground failures appeared to be precursors 
for failures in-flight.  While the magnitude of each 
vehicle’s contributions remained the same, the 
criticality of flight failures was somewhat reduced, 
implying somewhat effective screening methods prior to 
each mission.  Of the many component types, sensor, 
engine, valve and regulator failures were more likely to 
propagate to flight.   
 
Most plots indicated the highest-density failures were 
observed on Criticality 1, 1R2, 1R3 and 1SR 
components.   The prevalence of these issues and the 
large number of “close calls” reinforced the benefit of 
maintaining current agency failure tolerance 
requirements, at a minimum.   
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A preliminary comparative failure history analysis was 
developed to support risk-informed decisions for 
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 human-rated missions.  Additional research is required 
to define all corrective actions; however, interim 
recommendations include additional controls for high-
density Criticality 1 anomalies, including additional 
process inspections, cleanliness verifications, and 
targeted lessons from prior programs.   
 
As a secondary observation, a standalone review of 
human spaceflight failure history allowed the team to 
recognize common failures across multiple programs.  
Several examples are highlighted below.  In the future, 
additional coordination is needed to establish an 
effective framework for capturing valuable mitigations 
from prior programs, to ensure failures are not regularly 
repeated. 
 
Common Failures across Multiple Programs 
 
• Failed-closed pressurization valves 
• Latch valve degaussing 
• Loose sensor wires 
• Bellows leakage at both welds and convolutes 
• Fuel and Oxidizer Reaction Products (FORP) 
• Valve and tank gauging failures 
• Internal leakage of helium regulators and valves 
• External leakage of main engine pneumatic pack  
• Burst disc rupture 
• Excessive pull-in voltage  
• Internal leakage of ball valve shaft seals 
• Valve leakage due to pilot seat contamination 
 
From a data integration standpoint, the team would like 
to reiterate the need to finish reviewing and tabulating 
space shuttle RCS ground anomalies (all), space shuttle 
OMS ground anomalies (missing years), qualification 
anomalies (all) and additional Apollo reports.  These 
missing data sets will continue to be developed and 
included in future versions of this assessment. 
 
Finally, the S&MA research team would like to offer a 
few general process observations to improve failure 
history research, going forward.  NASA documentation 
at the National Archives was extremely difficult to 
retrieve in a short amount of time, and required 
personnel and financial resources.  To minimize these 
demands, multiple agencies stands to benefit from 
retrieving, digitizing and managing these reports in a 
controlled searchable platform.  A shared database 
would ensure files are subjected to a consistent set of 
screens for sensitive but unclassified (SBU) and 
Personal Identification Information (PII), while helping 
design engineers make critical decisions.  As deep-space 
missions drive higher technical and programmatic risks, 
a cross-program knowledge-sharing system would pay 
countless dividends in employee productivity, 
minimized ground and flight delays, and improved 
system reliability.   
 
8.    ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
0FT Zero-Failure Tolerant 
CIL Critical Items List 
DR Discrepancy Report 
DFMR Design for Minimum Risk 
ESA European Space Agency 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
ISS International Space Station (ISS) 
MER Mission Evaluation Reports 
MPCV Multi-Program Crew Vehicle  
MSERP MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance 
Safety and Engineering Review Panel 
(MSERP) 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
OMS Orbital Manoeuvring System 
PII Personal Identification Information 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
PRACA Problem Reporting and Corrective 
Action 
RCS Reaction Control System 
SPF Single Point Failure 
SBU Secure But Unclassified 
STS Space Transportation System 
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